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Abstract: It is commonly claimed, in the global justice literature, that global injustices 
are best characterised in terms of the violation or unfulfillment of human rights. I 
suggest that global justice theorists are overconfident on this point. For decolonising 
peoples, contemporary global injustice is likely to be characterised in terms drawn from 
local histories of injustice and the constellations of thick ethical concepts they contain. 
To make the point I describe how the Māori of New Zealand, who do not reject human 
rights, typically make no reference to human rights in political argument. I argue that 
the Māori are reasonable to consider human rights talk to be “one thought too many”, 
and the considerations that make this so typically apply in other post-colonial contexts 
of political activity.   
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1. Seeing global justice in terms of human rights  
 
 
It is now increasingly commonplace, in the philosophical literature on global justice and 
human rights, to follow Thomas Pogge in holding that the systemic effects of the present 
global institutional order violate or leave unfulfilled the human rights of billions of 
people.1 I certainly do not wish to dispute Pogge’s compelling argument that the current 
                                                             
1 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (2nd ed. New York, Polity, 2008). 
While Pogge’s position is currently the most widely visible, Henry Shue’s Basic Rights 
(2nd ed. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980) has also been extremely influential 
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global order is grossly unjust. What I wish to challenge is the assumption that this 
injustice is best characterised with reference to the unfulfilment or violation of human 
rights.  
 
It is not hard to see why so many current global justice theorists might find an appeal to 
human rights attractive. Global justice theorists are concerned about the atrophy of 
cosmopolitan sentiment in modern liberal societies,2 to which the supposedly global 
reach of human rights talk provides a solution that is effective both domestically and 
internationally. Thus Pogge, seeking a standard of justice that is at once fine-grained and 
internationally politically effective, asserts that ‘a conception of human rights is far 
more suitable than all the theoretical constructs currently discussed by academics’.3 
Global justice theorists frequently echo this belief in the political effectiveness of human 
rights talk. It is claimed that ‘for a growing number of people of all cultures in all 
regions’ human rights provide ‘attractive remedies’ to injustice;4 indeed, that human 
rights constitute a modern ‘lingua franca’,5 or ‘world culture’,6 ‘the common moral 
language’ of ‘peacetime global society’ insofar as there is one.7  
                                                                                                                                                                              
in putting human rights front and centre of the global justice debate. For examples of 
Pogge’s (and Shue’s) influence, see the various contributions to Thomas Pogge (ed.) 
Freedom From Poverty as a Human Right (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007) and 
to R. Cruft, S.M. Liao, and M. Renzo (ed.) The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
2 For example, Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 24-26. 
3 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 50; 56. 
4 Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 
29:1, 2007, 281-306 at 288. 
5 John Tasioulas, “The Moral Reality of Human Rights”, in Thomas Pogge (ed.) Freedom 
From Poverty as a Human Right (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), 75-102, at 
75. 
6 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 
2006), 304. 
7 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 1. 
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My aim in this paper is to raise the possibility that others elsewhere may see the 
injustices of the global institutional order in ways very different to the global justice 
theorists’ view. This is not a disagreement over whether the global order is unjust, but a 
disagreement over the nature of the injustice. I shall suggest that in post-colonial contexts 
of political activity the unjust effects of the global institutional order may take on a hue 
coloured far more by local historical narratives of injustice than by human rights talk. To 
bring out the structure of such thinking, I shall focus on one particular case, that of the 
New Zealand Māori. The middle sections of my paper are given over to a lengthy account 
of how and why Māori prefer to avoid human rights talk when making claims of right. In 
the construction I will place on Māori thinking, this is because human rights talk 
appears, to Māori, as one thought too many. We can of course ask whether Māori are 
reasonable to hold to such thinking. I argue that an historically grounded answer to this 
question should be an affirmative one, and that the sorts of considerations that make 
reasonable the Māori avoidance of human rights talk are likely to be present in many 
other post-colonial contexts.   
 
If my hypothesis is plausible, much theorising on questions of global justice may exhibit 
a kind of ignorance, recently and powerfully captured by Katrin Flikschuh: theorists 
transfer ideas from familiar domestic contexts to unfamiliar global ones without first 
asking how others elsewhere see matters.8 What is needed instead is a sufficiently 
historically and culturally textured account of how agents in different contexts of 
political activity see matters of justice. Questioning whether assertions of the political 
effectiveness of human rights talk are overconfident casts light on how much current 
theorising falls short in this regard. 
 
I shall also gesture to a more abstract point. The belief in the considerable global 
political effectiveness of human rights talk intersects in a complex way with the 
justifications global justice theorists offer for human rights as a philosophical idea. For 
example, global justice theorists typically display considerable vigilance against 
                                                             
8 Katrin Flikschuh, “The Idea of Philosophical Fieldwork: Global Justice, Moral Ignorance, 
Intellectual Attitudes”, Journal of Political Philosophy 22:1, 2014, 1-26. 
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inflationary conceptions of human rights.9 This vigilance seems driven by two related 
concerns. There is a concern from the philosophical side, that our most plausible 
understanding of human rights should be fundamentally grounded in the most 
important or vital human needs and interests – the ‘morality of the depths’, in Henry 
Shue’s oft-quoted phrase10 – and that too long and trivial a list of human rights becomes 
unmoored from this. But there is also a concern that too long and trivial a list of human 
rights will damagingly dilute the weighty political currency that human rights currently 
have. It is no accident that the standard philosophical justifications seek to preserve the 
political effectiveness of human rights talk. 
 
Claims about the political effectiveness of, and the philosophical justification for, human 
rights also intersect at a deeper level. The political effectiveness of human rights talk is 
often taken to reflect, and be explained by, a considerable consensus on substantive 
moral conclusions.11  Justifications for the philosophical idea of human rights also 
typically make use of a substantive consensus. Differing justificatory strategies locate 
and characterise this consensus in different ways, depending on whether the grounds 
for the philosophical idea of human rights are given by (for example) the deliverances of 
ordinary moral reasoning;12 or of an overlapping consensus on values;13 or by an 
                                                             
9 For example: Tasioulas, “The Moral Reality of Human Rights”, 75; James Griffin, On 
Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 14-15; Beitz, The Idea of Human 
Rights, 45.  
10 Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 18. 
11 For example: Jonathan Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health”, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. vol. 86, 2012, 217-237, at 219; Donnelly, 
“The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, 291-292.  
12 For example, Griffin, On Human Rights; Tasioulas, “The Moral Reality of Human 
Rights”; Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health”; see also Shue, Basic Rights, 
179.  
13 For example, Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice; Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of 
Human Rights”. 
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interpretive reconstruction of existing human rights practice.14 The latter two strategies 
must appeal to such a consensus: overlapping consensus arguments obviously rely on it, 
while interpretative strategies must begin with assumed agreement on ‘paradigmatic 
instances’ of – and thus some sense of the point and purpose of – the institutions or 
practices to be interpretatively reconstructed.15 Appeals to ‘ordinary moral reasoning’ 
need not invoke consensus if grounded in a sufficiently robust moral realism, but many 
such appeals do invoke consensus.  
 
This is to say that vindications for the philosophical idea of human rights often proceed 
from the assertion that certain basic needs or values capture a common human 
consensus on what matters most. An extreme, though revealing, example is Jonathan 
Wolff’s recent assertion that ‘a great deal of political philosophy is now settled’ by the 
practical consensus on human rights.16 Not everyone may want to go quite that far, but 
it is significant here that even critics of expansively cosmopolitan accounts of global 
justice allow that a minimal cosmopolitan position can be grounded in consensus on 
human rights.17 
 
One consequence of this deep intersection between claims about the justification for 
human rights as a philosophical idea and claims about the political effectiveness of 
human rights talk is that it is very hard to see how, following the standard justificatory 
strategy, one could even register the ways in which claims about the global political 
effectiveness of human rights talk could be overstated. My main concern here is to raise 
the possibility that global justice theorists are too quick to assume that global injustices 
are best characterised through the language of human rights. But I shall also gesture to 
                                                             
14 For example, Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights; Raz, “Human Rights Without 
Foundations”; and Andrea Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality”, 
Journal of Political Philosophy 16:2, 2008, 137-164. 
15 Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality”, 148.  
16 Wolff, “The Demands of the Human Right to Health”, 220. 
17 For example, David Miller, “Cosmopolitanism: A Critique”, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 5:3, 2005, 80-85.   
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the further conclusion that, precisely because the standard justificatory strategy cannot 
register such overstatements, we should rethink that strategy. 
 
2. Human Rights Talk as a Mode of Legitimation 
 
To think about the political effectiveness of human rights talk is to think of human rights 
as what I shall call a mode of legitimation. As Quentin Skinner once rightly observed, ‘any 
course of action will be inhibited to the degree that it cannot be legitimised. Any 
principle that helps to legitimise a course of action will therefore be among the enabling 
conditions of its occurrence.’18 Accordingly, I shall speak of diverse modes of 
legitimation: the particular constellations of normative considerations into which agents 
cast their chosen courses of action in order to secure the support of others.  
 
And modes of legitimation certainly are diverse. Modes of legitimation may have moral 
content, and the human rights mode is an excellent case in point. Yet other effective 
modes may, for example, be pragmatic (appeals to efficiency or productivity) or grandly 
metaphysical (appeals to the direction, or indeed the end, of history). Nor must all 
modes aspire to be universal: some may be extremely parochial and no less effective for 
it, as in the enduring mode in American politics of casting one’s action in line with 
Revolutionary values and aims. The effectiveness of any given mode of legitimation may 
also wax and wane over time: compare Marxist modes in Western European political 
contexts now as opposed to the 1950s. When a mode is effective, it will be subject to the 
pressures of rhetorical redescription from a variety of angles.19  
 
There is a good reason why political modes of legitimation cover such an open-ended 
and unpredictable field. Michael Oakeshott makes the point well with his memorable 
nautical metaphor: ‘in political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; 
                                                             
18 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics vol I (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 156. 
19 W.G. Runciman, “Cultural Selection, Axiological Rationality, and Paradiastole”, Archives 
Europeenes de Sociologie 48, 2007, 173-189. 
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there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting place nor 
appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel’.20 The 
constraints on what might stand as a mode of legitimation are contingent, determined 
by what is already there in existing traditions of political activity as they play out in 
current contexts.21 The existence of any specific mode of legitimation in any given 
context of political activity is therefore determined solely by the fact that its operation is 
recognised, by agents in the relevant context, as being effective.  
 
With all this in mind, there is no doubt that human rights talk has come to represent a 
powerful mode of legitimation in many contexts of political activity. Yet while global 
justice theorists are keen to emphasise the effectiveness of human rights talk as a mode 
of legitimation, the way they do so is marked by a number of elisions. The human rights 
mode is invariably presented in isolation, both from the particular conditions in the 
1970s within which the mode came to have the effectiveness it now enjoys,22 and from 
any other modes of legitimation that may be present in actual contexts of political 
activity. Accordingly, global justice theorists do not ask whether the conditions that 
make human rights an effective mode in some contexts apply in all current contexts, or 
whether other modes interact with the human rights mode in ways that limit its 
effectiveness. In post-colonial contexts I think it quite likely that other modes will have 
this limiting effect, and I want to emphasise the point by focussing on contemporary 
Māori political argument in New Zealand. To do this I will be speaking of Māori, who are 
of course the indigenous population of New Zealand, and also of Pākehā, the name by 
which New Zealanders of European extraction typically refer to themselves. I do not 
                                                             
20 Michael Oakeshott, “Political Education”, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays 
(London, Methuen, 1962), 127. 
21  It may be possible to say something in the abstract by adducing some basic 
“circumstances of politics” that no mode of legitimation could plausibly argue away. But 
such a list can tell us nothing about how such circumstances should be addressed – only 
that we must address them somehow. I say more on this in my “The Circumstances of 
Justice” Hume Studies 36:2, 2010, 125-148. 
22 Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2010) is excellent on this point. 
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choose to focus on the Māori context out of any desire to put Māori thinking on some 
kind of “exotic” pedestal, but simply because it is the context I am most familiar with.  
 
3. Human rights as one thought too many 
 
It is unwise to generalise too much about Māori political argument, and the following 
remarks are a tentative attempt by one Pākehā observer to understand only the Māori 
tendency to avoid appeals to the human rights mode of legitimation. This avoidance is 
not a matter of Māori rejecting the standard set of human rights: only a vanishingly 
small percentage of Māori endorse fundamentally illiberal outlooks.23 To philosophical 
proponents of human rights, this may seem to settle any controversy: if one accepts the 
standard view of human rights one can surely have no objection to seeing the 
colonisation of Māori, with all its inequality, violence, and prejudice, as a history of 
human rights violations. Here, it may be thought, is one more context in which injustices 
are best condemned through the human rights mode of legitimation. But that is not how 
Māori portray their own history and claims of right in political argument, and it is worth 
asking what they do and why they do it. 
 
As to what Māori do, two examples will I hope suffice. Consider first the following 
remarks from a 1995 High Court affidavit by Ngāi Tahu scholar Hirini Moko Mead: 
The act of whakawhānau [giving birth] produces a newborn child, a whenua 
[placenta] and eventually a pito [umbilical cord]. The whenua and the pito 
are buried or placed within the land of the whanau [extended family] and 
                                                             
23 I emphasise this point to distance my argument from what has become known as the 
“human rights vs Asian values” debate. See further Hirini Moko Mead, Tikanga Māori 
(Huia, Wellington, 2003), which is – although Mead does not stress the point explicitly – 
a detailed meditation on the extent to which Māori culture is more liberal than it was. 
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that establishes a spiritual link between the land and the child. Once born 
the child inherits a number of rights called a birthright.24 
Mead is not simply describing a traditional Māori view. He is making a contemporary 
argument, appealing to the genealogical links that ground a bundle of fundamental and 
inalienable rights each and every Māori possesses by birthright. These are basic 
entitlements that all others, including governments and the law, must as a matter of 
justice respect.  
 
Consider second, the claimants’ arguments in the Waitangi Tribunal’s Whanganui River 
Report. There one will find Māori claims of right to the river invoking the river’s 
existence as an independent metaphysical being with its own mauri (lifeforce), invoking 
the whakapapa (genealogy) links that bind this entity to the local iwi*, and insisting that 
these genealogical ties mean that the mana† of the local iwi is complexly interpenetrated 
with the mana of the river itself and of its resident taniwha (sacred water creatures).25 
                                                             
24 Te Rūnanga ō te Upoko ō te Iki Association & ors v. The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission and others (1998), C.P. No. 122/95 (H.Ct. of New Zealand, Auckland 
Registery). Mead affidavit at 7-8. 
* Whanau, hapu, and iwi all denote kin groups. Whanau = extended family; hapu = a 
number of whanau closely linked through genealogy; iwi = a number of hapu closely 
linked through genealogy. Each word also means birth (whanau), pregnant (hapu), and 
bone (iwi), again reinforcing the fundamental importance of genealogical ties. 
Traditionally hapu were the main social unit in Māori society; in the last century iwi 
have become so. 
† Mana is a complex moral concept, possessed of individuals, groups, and both natural 
and supernatural entities. One’s mana is a fundamental part of one’s identity, describing 
one’s worth, status, integrity, charisma, and influence. Mana also denotes authority, 
control, and jurisdiction; and is a fundamental aspect of the traditional Māori 
understanding of agency. There is a strongly metaphysical aspect to mana, expressed in 
the numerous ways the concept connects to that of tapu (roughly: the sacred or 
forbidden).   
25 Waitangi Tribunal, Whanganui River Report, (Wai-167, Wellington, GP Publications, 
1999), ch. 2. 
 11 
All of this amounts to a claim of authority over the river, of which Māori have been 
systematically dispossessed since the onset of the colonial period. 
 
The thinking underlying these rights claims is well-captured by Moana Jackson: 
In general terms, the rights of tāngata whenua‡ share the same concerns as 
those rights which the United Nations affirms... What makes them specific is 
the fact that... [the Māori set of rights] clearly exists and has a validity 
independent of international law. It is inherent in Māori law, in the concept 
of rangatiratanga*, and in the poetry of our whakataukī or proverbs.26  
In making this point, Jackson is insisting that the justificatory grounds and validity of 
Māori claims of right to land, to resources, and to political authority and access to social 
institutions (rangatiratanga covers all these things27) rest, and should be seen as resting, 
solely on distinctively Māori considerations. And that is typically what Māori claims of 
right do rest on.  
 
Māori arguments consistently assert a set of rights held uniquely by Māori, recognition 
of which must form the core of any just institutional arrangement for post-contact times. 
                                                             
‡ Tāngata whenua being a typical Māori expression referring to Māori as a group. 
Tāngata = “people”; whenua = “land”, also “placenta”, thereby neatly expressing the 
genealogical tie to the land that Māori have. 
* Rangatiratanga = (roughly) in modern usage, the rights and authority Māori should as a 
matter of justice have; the existence of a sphere of affairs in which Māori authority 
should be, if not supreme, very significant. Traditionally, rangatiratanga = the way of 
going on characteristic of a chief, including the rights and authority he or she possesses 
(rangatira = chief). 
26 Jackson, “The Crown, the Treaty, and the Usurpation of Māori Rights”, in Aotearoa New 
Zealand and Human Rights in the Asia Pacific Region: a Policy Conference (Wellington, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989), 17-20 at 17. Compare  Ani Mikaere, Colonising Myths 
– Māori Realities: He Rukuruku Whakaaro (Huia, Wellington, 2011), 186. 
27 See further my “The Roots and Reach of Rangatiratanga”, Political Science 56:1, 2004, 
23-54. 
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Such rights are in a sense natural, as to be Māori is to possess this set of inalienable 
rights. But what is natural about such rights is explained by a distinctively Māori 
genealogical and animist understanding of nature. The justification for these rights is 
inseparably intermeshed with the significance of whakapapa: the genealogical links 
reaching back to creation that are utterly fundamental to Māori perceptions of 
personhood and culture, and whose importance shapes a whole range of Māori thick 
ethical concepts. In the words of Apirana Mahuika, ‘whakapapa is the heart and core of 
all Māori institutions, from Creation to what is now iwi. Whakapapa is the determinant 
of all mana rights ... and one’s place and status within society’.28 
 
It is important to understand that Māori are not simply appealing to rights grounded in 
indigeneity or ethnicity. Māori typically consider whakapapa lines (and associated 
rights) to become shapeless and incoherent when generalised across Māoridom. Thus, 
Tūhoe elder John Rangihau declares:  
My being Māori is absolutely dependent on my history as a Tūhoe person as 
against being a Māori person. Each tribe has its own history. And it’s not a 
history that can be shared among others. How can I share with the history of 
Ngāti Porou, of Te Arawa, of Waikato? Because I am not of those people. I 
am a Tūhoe person and all I can share in is Tūhoe history .... I have a faint 
suspicion that Māoritanga is a term coined by the Pākehā to bring the tribes 
together. Because if you cannot divide and rule, then for tribal people all you 
can do is unite them and rule. Because then they will lose everything by 
losing their own tribal histories and traditions that give them their 
identity.29 
What I hope is now clear is that whakapapa denotes a complex web of particular 
genealogical strands that each impart the rights that Māori claim. These rights are not 
rights claimable by any indigenous person in the manner of the 2007 UN Declaration.  
                                                             
28 Apirana Mahuika, “Whakapapa is the Heart”, in K.S. Coates and P.G. McHugh, Living 
Relationships (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 1998), 218-219; compare Mikaere, 
Colonising Myths – Māori Realities, ch.11. 
29 John Rangihau, “Being Māori”, in M. King (ed.), Te Ao Hurihuri (Wellington, Hicks 
Smith, 1975), 190. 
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When Māori ground claims of right in whakapapa they are deploying a mode of 
legitimation taking its terms solely from a uniquely Māori worldview. Of course, Māori 
also use and have used other modes of legitimation. Post-contact history reveals a 
number of at times ingenious Māori attempts at casting their claims of right into modes 
of legitimation that might gain better traction with European audiences: monarchical 
and biblical modes in the 19th century; more liberal modes in more recent times. Yet 
there is an increasingly audible sense among Māori that they should not have to do this, 
that the assertion of Māori special rights should be accepted as legitimate on its own 
terms.30 And so this distinctively Māori mode now shapes the other modes of 
legitimation Māori deploy. When, for example, Māori appeal to the Treaty of Waitangi (a 
19th century document detailing a somewhat obscure division of authority between the 
Crown and Māori), they resist the common Pākehā assumption that the Treaty creates 
special contractual rights for Māori. Māori view the Treaty as simply protecting 
whakapapa rights that would exist even if the Treaty had never been signed, and in 
doing so bend the Treaty mode to the shape of the whakapapa mode.31 Māori do the 
same on those occasions when they appeal to UN indigenous rights, detaching those 
rights from the universal grounding the UN language gives them.32 All of this is to say 
that the deployment of a distinctively Māori mode of legitimation is a persistent and 
significant feature of Māori political argument.  
                                                             
30 I discuss this further in “Justice and Legitimacy in Māori Claims: Reflections on F.M. 
Brookfield’s Waitangi and Indigenous Rights”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
33:1, 2008, 179-192; see also Moana Jackson, “The Treaty and the Word: The 
Colonisation of Māori Philosophy”, in G. Oddie and R. Perrett (ed.) Justice, Ethics, and 
New Zealand Society (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1992); Mikaere, Colonising 
Myths – Māori Realities ch. 9. 
31 Hugh Kawharu, “Rangatiratanga and Sovereignty by 2040”, He Pūkenga Kōrero 1:2, 
1996.  
32 Mahuika, “Whakapapa is the Heart”, 218-219, notes that while Māori ‘employ the 
ethnic and iwi base when the circumstances demand it’, ethnicity ‘cannot usurp the 
mana and role of whakapapa’. For an excellent history of the unstable and temporary 
nature of Māori political agency as an ethnic group, see Lindsay Cox, Kotahitanga 
(Auckland, Oxford, 1993). 
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It is worth registering, at this point, that Māori deploy this mode of legitimation in a 
context of political activity that is deeply multicultural. What makes the distinctively 
Māori mode of legitimation distinctively Māori is the constellation of thick ethical 
concepts it employs. These concepts are not part of the liberal social morality that 
Pākehā New Zealanders bear, and where Pākehā respect Māori practices or claims of 
right it is not typically because they accept, as Māori accept, concepts such as mana as 
reason-giving. Pākehā typically accept Māori claims of right, when and insofar as they 
do, because their own reason-giving concepts give them reason to. This makes for a 
complicated political muddle and fudge. It also makes for a Pākehā backlash of sorts, 
most typically through irate letters to media outlets and almost never through violence. 
Yet it has proved possible for Pākehā to take the distinctively Māori mode seriously 
enough, despite the generally poor Pākehā understanding of the whakapapa worldview, 
that the mode operates effectively: the backlash generated by Māori use of the 
whakapapa mode is never enough to silence its effectiveness.  
 
This has been a rather lengthy account of what Māori do; I shall be briefer on the 
question of why they do it. The explanation for the Māori avoidance of the human rights 
mode is no doubt extremely complex,33 and all I can do is stipulate here what I take to be 
one central part of that explanation. For Māori, the human rights mode of legitimation 
gets the nature of the injustice wrong. Māori claims are made in terms of the mana and 
rangatiratanga of the claimants, grounded in the claimants’ whakapapa. If such claims 
were to be cast within the human rights mode of legitimation, these considerations 
would appear as culturally specific instances of whichever general human concerns 
ground the appropriate rights. To attempt to legitimise Māori demands for justice by 
casting them in the human rights mode of legitimation is thus unavoidably to portray 
the past and continuing injustices to be remedied as fundamentally and in the first 
instance violations of human rights rather than of Māori mana and rangatiratanga. Yet 
clearly, as far as Māori are concerned, it is mana and rangatiratanga that has been 
violated. For this reason casting the injustice in terms of the human rights mode of 
                                                             
33 See further Jackson, “The Treaty and the Word: The Colonisation of Māori 
Philosophy”, and Mikaere, Colonising Myths – Māori Realities. 
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legitimation would sound, I think to many Māori ears, a bit inappropriate – involving, 
one might say, one thought too many. 
 
This way of putting things may sound as though there is no serious conflict between the 
whakapapa mode and the human rights mode: the justification for the claim that Māori 
suffered injustice is simply over-determined. Bernard Williams’s readers will know 
better. The phrase “one thought too many” is deployed by Williams to mark 
considerations of reasoning that are inappropriate in light of the correct reasons for 
action.34 One might (in the case Williams discusses) save one’s wife from drowning, 
rather than a drowning stranger, simply because she is your wife, or because one must 
always maximise the best consequences and in this case it turns out that saving one’s 
wife achieves that. The first mode of reasoning is correct, and grasping this shows the 
second, overly impartial, mode of reasoning to be inappropriate. I think something 
similar is going on when Māori avoid human rights talk. A sophisticated conception of 
human rights will include respect for culture, so that respect for human rights 
necessarily involves respect for mana and rangatiratanga. But the problem remains: 
justice will still appear only indirectly concerned, in virtue of human rights, with Māori 
mana and rangatiratanga. There is still one thought too many. The only modes of 
legitimation that can actually capture what it is Māori demand are the distinctively 
Māori mode of legitimation and those that can be successfully bent to its shape. The 
human rights mode of legitimation is not one of those, and that I suspect is why Māori 
avoid it.  
 
4. Can human rights reasonably be one thought too many? 
 
So what should we say about this? The first thing to say is that in Williams’s drowning 
wife scenario, it matters that the perspective from which we can see that there is ‘one 
thought too many’ in overly impartial forms of reasoning is the perspective of someone 
who understands the right reasons for action. This thought raises, in a rather stark way, 
the question of whether the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is reasonable. Human 
rights talk only appears as one thought too many from the standpoint of the whakapapa 
                                                             
34 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 18. 
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worldview. If that worldview strikes you as an implausibly enchanted one, you may well 
conclude that the reasonable thing for Māori to do is shift to a different way of 
characterising injustice – say, in terms of human rights.  
 
One could go further. The liberal social morality from which global justice theorists 
draw their conceptions of human rights articulates things that liberals sincerely believe 
about themselves and humanity. The terms of the Māori mode of legitimation are not 
part of that social morality; they are part of a genealogical animism that the liberal 
outlook typically rejects as false or side-lines as inappropriate to reasoned reflection on 
normative questions. It may therefore be very tempting to see the Māori use of the 
whakapapa mode as Māori making a conceptual last stand:35 a necessarily futile attempt 
at seeing things from a conceptual point of view for which the requisite concepts are 
lost; the futility of which goes unrecognised by those making the attempt because they 
refuse to wake up to the fact that their old form of life is gone. If one sees Māori political 
argument in this way, the question of the reasonableness of Māori invocations of 
whakapapa rights has a straightforward answer in the negative. It may seem as though 
the notion of toleration provides the best means for handling the question. One might 
say, appealing to the value of toleration, that a duty not to deny Māori usage of the 
whakapapa mode of legitimation, despite the unreasonableness of such usage, makes 
political sense. 
 
However, there is also a question about the sorts of considerations we allow to bear on 
the question of whether the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is reasonable. It may 
seem attractive to take a very short line and reject as unreasonable the Māori insistence 
on deploying the whakapapa mode, by appeal to either the moral truth of human rights 
or to a stringently Rawlsian prohibition on richly metaphysical arguments. Yet these 
sorts of responses are too quick: they treat the question as a philosophical one (which it 
obviously is) without allowing that it is also a political one (which it also obviously is). 
The question of whether Māori are unreasonable to avoid human rights talk must have 
an historically-grounded answer, by which I mean we must take account of what the 
question presupposes about the agents, and their histories, we are asking it of. What it 
                                                             
35 I take the idea of a conceptual last stand from Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope (Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2006), 26-33. 
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presupposes is that the Māori need not see historical and continuing injustice in terms 
drawn from the whakapapa worldview. And in a sense this is true. The animist, 
genealogical worldview of whakapapa is not the only option Māori now have for 
understanding the world, and indeed they need to spend considerable energy in 
maintaining this option as a live one. 
 
It is important to register the fact that it is only now a contingent matter, in a way that it 
was not then, that Māori perceive injustice in the way they do.36 Māori at the initial point 
of contact and colonisation could scarcely have seen the injustices that befell them in 
any terms other than those of the whakapapa worldview: that worldview provided, to 
Māori, the only available conceptual apparatus for making sense of their situation.37 It is 
of course a broader historical contingency that this was the case, as it was that the Māori 
outlook took the shape it did at that time, but those contingencies do not bear on the 
point at hand. What matters is that it remains the case that the Māori perception of 
injustice in the early contact era was and could only have been shaped by the 
whakapapa worldview alone.  
                                                             
36 Here I owe a huge debt to J.G.A Pocock’s “The Treaty Between Histories”, in A. Sharp 
and P.G. McHugh (ed), Histories, Power, and Loss (Wellington, Bridget Williams, 2001).  
37 I realise this may be a controversial claim. Some, such as Gananath Obeyesekere, see 
human reason as fundamentally informed by practical concerns that are broadly the 
same everywhere; cultural contingencies do not cut deep. See Obeyesekere’s heated 
exchange with Marshal Sahlins, in their respective The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: 
European Mythmaking in the South Pacific (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994) 
and How ‘Natives’ Think, About Captain Cook, For Example (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1995). My own view, which I cannot argue for adequately here, is that the 
forces which animate human reasoning do not amount to a shared substantively human 
form of life. For instance, the continual flux of cooperation and conflict between Māori 
and Europeans in the early post-contact period – captured in Anne Salmond, Two 
Worlds: First Meetings Between Māori and Europeans 1642-1772 (Auckland, Viking, 
1991) – can only adequately be explained in terms of a distance of understanding 
reaching far deeper than a simple lack of ability to communicate the deliverances of a 
substantively shared reasonable outlook to each other (or to the effects of unreasoned 
ideology).  
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The position of contemporary Māori is different: they can, if they wish, draw on all the 
diverse and competing intellectual resources made available to them by the conditions 
of modernity. Yet putting things just like that obscures from view the ways in which the 
position of contemporary Māori is a deeply uncomfortable one. What makes the Māori 
experience of modernity uncomfortable is the way in which Māori have been forced, by 
the legacy of colonization, into a necessarily bicultural form of life.38 There is no feasible 
way for Māori to return to the pre-contact form of life, and any attempt Māori now make 
to define and defend a distinctively Māori form of life must involve grappling with the 
extent to which the contents of that form of life constitute a bricolage of diverse origins. 
Such attempts by Māori should not be confused with any nostalgic longing for an 
unrecoverable past. As Bernard Williams once wrote of how we stand in relation to the 
thought of our own philosophical ancestors, ‘it is not a question of reviving anything. 
What is dead is dead, and in many important respects we would not want to revive it 
even if we knew what that could mean.’39 Māori are all too aware of this point, and the 
acknowledgement that the pre-contact form of life is unrecoverable is what drives Māori 
to fight so hard to preserve a distinctively Māori form of life now. In this, the Māori 
experience of modernity no doubt mirrors the experience of decolonising peoples 
generally.  
 
For Maori, therefore, the fact that it wasn’t then, but it is now, a contingent matter that 
Māori characterise injustice in terms of whakapapa rights itself now has political 
resonance. Just as the current abiding Māori sense of injustice involves an historical 
narrative linking together the injustices suffered in the post-contact period, so current 
Māori claims of right are seen by Māori as continuing a tradition of political activity 
aiming to resist and undo the injustices of colonisation; a tradition reaching back to the 
onset of colonial injustice. The fact that the worldview of whakapapa is not the only 
option Māori now have for characterising injustice itself cements the distinctively Māori 
                                                             
38 Here I am indebted to Andrew Sharp’s “Why Be Bicultural?”, in A. Wilson and M. 
Yeatman (ed.) Justice and Identity, (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1995). See 
especially 131, n6. 
39 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1993), 7. 
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mode of legitimation at the core of this tradition of political activity, because the current 
contingency of the whakapapa worldview is part of the Māori narrative of injustice and 
loss. This should be totally unsurprising, given how that contingency came about. Māori 
political activity is historically informed in such a way that it is no simple matter for 
Māori to abandon the distinctively Māori mode of legitimation in favour of some other 
mode that cannot accommodate the contents of the Māori mode. For Māori to do so 
would, for example, be to concede that previous generations of Māori in the struggle 
against colonisation were in the grip of an error about the nature of the injustice 
suffered. I find it extraordinarily hard to conceive how, in any argument that seeks 
fidelity with the ongoing Māori tradition of attempting to erase the injustices of 
colonisation, the distinctively Māori mode of legitimation could be abandoned.  
 
What I hope is now clear is that, while it is the constellation of thick ethical concepts at 
the centre of the Māori mode of legitimation that makes it distinctively Māori, it is the 
political resonance of these concepts that keeps the mode to the fore in Māori political 
activity. Māori have a continual tradition of characterising the injustices of colonisation 
in these terms, which is itself sustained by the way in which the contingency of the 
whakapapa worldview is a part of the narrative of colonial injustice. These political 
resonances effectively foist onto Māori political activity a constellation of ethical 
concepts that bear the historical deposit of the traditional Māori form of life, but also 
bear the historical deposit of Māori attempts at making sense of and inhabiting post-
colonial circumstances. The fact that the whakapapa mode of legitimation takes its 
terms from a constellation of concepts that now bear a far more complicated historical 
deposit than they did 300 years ago illuminates the incredibly complex question facing 
Māori of what they take the Māori worldview to be. While the current contingency of the 
whakapapa worldview is part of the Māori narrative of injustice, not all that was once in 
it but now lost is mourned. The whakapapa mode of legitimation is therefore at once 
outward-facing, used to legitimate claims of right in political engagement with Pākehā, 
and inward-facing – by which I mean it has an essential presence in debates among 
Māori about the shape and content of the whakapapa worldview.  
 
I am now able to give an answer to the question of whether the Māori avoidance of 
human rights talk is reasonable. There is a real sense in which the whakapapa 
worldview remains a live option for Māori – it is not simply a conceptual last stand – and 
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the sense in which it is a live option is imbued with deep political significance for Māori. 
That political significance must make any liberal response cast in terms of tolerating the 
Māori use of the distinctively Māori mode of legitimation appear to Māori as high-
handed condescension. If this sounds right, then we will have to allow for the possibility 
that, while histories of colonisation are invariably histories of human rights violations, 
that is not necessarily all they are to those whose identities have been shaped by the 
experience. It may seem, to such people as it does to Māori, that human rights violations 
are not the most important aspects of their histories of injustice, and under certain 
conditions such people may reasonably resent attempts at casting their history as a 
history of human rights violations. 
 
It is important that resentment is reasonable only under some conditions. The abolition 
of institutionalised racism in the American South, insofar as it has actually been 
abolished, is no doubt deeply resented by those racists who wish to, but can no longer, 
feasibly recover what they think of as a proper way of life (for instance, they seem very 
upset by the existence of interracial marriage). We would not want to say their 
resentment was reasonable. How we draw the line here should turn, in part, on whether 
we consider the resentment to be bound up in what is justifiably a history shaped by 
injustice. And that will involve doing some practical philosophy, giving a robust 
justification for the criteria of justice we’re using when we draw that line. 
 
For global justice theorists, the Southern racists’ resentment will be straightforwardly 
unreasonable, because the racists’ racism is thoroughly antithetical to the concerns 
grounding human rights. Things are different in the case of the colonised people 
asserting special natural rights, because the historical record of colonisation will itself 
typically create the conditions for reasonable resentment. Anyone whose reflection on 
questions of injustice is informed by the standard account of human rights should have 
no difficulty seeing histories of colonisation as cases where serious moral wrong has 
been done: that much is accessible, even if claims of special natural rights may sound 
more worrying. In the Māori case, the liberal history of New Zealand is also a history in 
which Māori suffer severe injustice, and this has proved sufficient to encourage the 
awkward navigation of the other side’s constellation of thick concepts, and enables 
Pākehā to accept the Māori use of the whakapapa mode of legitimation. 
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I am not suggesting that this thin convergence of histories is, of itself, sufficient to 
vindicate the reasonableness of the Māori avoidance of human rights talk. It cannot be, 
because a convergence in thin concepts – both sides agree “wrong” was done – cannot 
dissolve the fact that the thick concepts Māori use to characterise the nature of the 
wrong are not part of the liberal social morality. What vindicates the reasonableness of 
the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is that any plausible reflection on questions of 
injustice or wrongdoing will also have to acknowledge the historical deposit embedded 
in the moral concepts we use to characterise the wrongs of colonisation. Such reflection 
must also acknowledge how, within ongoing political traditions of resistance to 
colonisation, that deposit is perceived to relate to the historical record. The current 
contingency of the worldview of whakapapa, and the political resonances of that 
contingency, is one such case in point. Kofi Quashigah’s contribution to this symposium 
highlights another: the political resonance in post-colonial constitutional jurisprudence 
in sub-Saharan Africa of anything resembling the “repugnancy test” of the colonial era.40 
It makes neither good political nor good philosophical sense to think that it is a simple 
or justifiable matter to recast the colonised’s claims of right into modern liberal 
concepts and categories. And this conclusion can be reached without taking any view on 
whether genealogical animism, or any other outlook, accurately reflects the absolute 
conception of reality. 
 
5. A less uniform perspective on global injustice 
 
The reader, at this juncture, may be wondering just how far one can generalise the point 
I am seeking to make. All the world is of course not New Zealand. And that fact may 
seem to severely undermine my starting hypothesis that there may be relevant 
connections between the Māori context and other post-colonial contexts; especially 
those contexts which are the primary concern of global justice theorists. Although Māori 
are severely disproportionately represented at the wrong end of every social welfare 
statistic in New Zealand, they are in global terms well-off members of a stable, 
transparent democratic society. It may seem that the Māori argument in terms of 
whakapapa rights is a luxury that is unaffordable in many post-colonial contexts, and 
                                                             
40 Quashigah, “Justice in the Traditional African Society Within the Modern 
Constitutional Set-Up”, Jurisprudence, this volume. 
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that where this luxury is unaffordable, the human rights mode of legitimation may seem 
to hold out by far the best possibility for securing action to condemn and rectify 
injustice. 
 
This is an important point, but it does not show as much as the global justice theorist 
might think it does. Recall that Māori have deployed various modes of legitimation they 
hoped might be conducive to non-Māori ears; all the time holding that these modes did 
not adequately capture the nature of the injustice to be rectified and were, in the 
construction I am placing on Māori thinking, one thought too many. One would still be 
able to – and should – ask, of other post-colonial contexts where the systemic injustices 
of the global institutional order bite deepest, whether those in local forms of life 
grappling with the legacy of colonisation view the human rights mode of legitimation as 
an equally non-ideal option. And the flipside of that question is to ask to what extent the 
human rights mode appears, from the Western perspective, as a lingua franca simply 
because the West is not prepared to listen to anything other than the human rights 
mode.  
 
It strikes me that the considerations that lead Māori to avoid the human rights mode of 
legitimation may be widely generalisable across post-colonial contexts, in virtue of what 
I earlier called the at once inward and outward facing nature of the distinctively Māori 
mode. The political resonances of the distinctively Māori mode make it central to Māori 
political activity and claims of right against non-Māori and to the task of determining the 
current shape of the whakapapa worldview. Indeed, these two sets of questions 
interpenetrate to such a degree that I do not think one could sensibly see two 
completely distinct intellectual enterprises (claiming justice; sorting out the contents of 
a culture) here. So here is my suggestion: wherever the current contingency of an 
indigenous or traditional worldview is part of the local narrative of injustice, it is quite 
likely that significant political resonance will attach to a mode of legitimation that draws 
its terms from that worldview. There will (almost?) invariably be a need for political 
argument in post-colonial contexts to make use of modes of legitimation that, like the 
Māori mode, take their shape from the traditional worldview.  
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That need will arise, at least in part, from the task of vindicating the present and ongoing 
shape the traditional worldview is held to take. It is not clear to me how that task could 
possibly be sensibly separated from political activity, and one excellent illustration of 
this is Quashigah’s nuanced discussion, in this symposium, of how modern African 
constitutionalism navigates the confrontations between traditional social morality and a 
social morality that is at once African and shaped by an ‘imported external view of life’.41 
It may of course turn out that in many post-colonial contexts what can be vindicated as 
the local equivalent to the whakapapa worldview may be more conducive to human 
rights talk – albeit perhaps a reconceptualisation of human rights talk42 – than the 
whakapapa worldview is. But this cannot be assumed as a matter of faith, and it is at 
least worth pausing to ask how well the human rights mode of legitimation fits with 
these traditionally-focussed modes, rather than rushing to assert the primacy of the 
human rights mode. 
 
I have here advanced a very speculative point, but it does not strike me as one that is 
implausible. What does strike me is the way in which philosophical defences of human 
rights struggle to register this possibility. Thomas Pogge, unusually for the literature, is 
explicit about who he takes his audience to be: his argument only addresses ‘affluent 
people everywhere... not because I see the poor as passive subjects rather than agents, 
but because I don’t take myself to have any standing to advise them.’43 I can see why 
Pogge says so: due to the systemic injustices in the global institutional order that shape 
the global distribution of wealth the well-off, regardless of political or cultural context, 
have benefitted from neglect of human rights. Yet it is nonetheless remarkable that 
Pogge defines his audience solely in terms of an economic category. When political and 
cultural contexts are left out, there is no way of accounting for the sorts of complexities 
that exist in post-colonial contexts. And when those complexities are obscured, it is hard 
                                                             
41 See further Quashigah, “Justice in the Traditional African Society Within the Modern 
Constitutional Set-Up”. 
42 On this point see Ajume Wingo, “The Odyssey of Human Rights”, Transition 102:1, 
2010, 120-138. 
43 Thomas Pogge, “Responses to the Critics”, in A. Jaggar (ed.) Thomas Pogge and His 
Critics (Cambridge MA, Polity, 2010), 209. 
 24 
to see what underpins Pogge’s confidence in the political effectiveness of the human 
rights mode of legitimation. 
  
Most other global justice theorists are far less explicit about who they take their 
audiences to be. My impression is that most take themselves to be addressing the 
inhabitants of the world at large under the conditions of modernity. Yet that domain is 
frequently idealised, with participants in the practices of liberal modernity assumed to 
accept something of its liberalism. To give one example from a cornerstone of the 
literature, Jim Griffin defends a consensus on human rights by invoking the ‘massive 
increase in global communication, convergence on economic structures, 
homogenization of ways of life due to growing prosperity, and widespread travel and 
study abroad precisely by the persons most likely to be influential in their societies’.44 
This sort of idealised view is an unavoidable consequence of the justificatory strategy of 
appealing to the existence of a common substantive moral consensus. But it makes 
contemporary philosophical conceptions ill-equipped to account for the many ways in 
which the institutions of liberal capitalism are not so central to varied local forms of life 
that alternative constellations of ethical concepts are untenable.  
 
The injustices in the global order that defenders of human rights highlight should put 
pressure on the assumption that reasonable modern individuals see these injustices in 
light of a concern with basic human rights. I would be very interested to know the extent 
to which the perception of these injustices, in post-colonial contexts of political activity, 
is inextricably bound up with the local history of colonisation, and with attempts at 
overcoming the continued effects and legacy of that history. It would not surprise me at 
all if, among bearers of local forms of life shaped by colonial impositions on culture, 
territory, and livelihood, the contemporary impacts of the unjust global order were 
viewed as continuations of the history of colonisation, to be cast within indigenous 
modes of legitimation. To the extent that this is the case, human rights talk is likely to 
represent, as it does for the Māori, an inappropriate mode of legitimation. That we 
struggle to register this possibility within philosophical justifications for human rights 
                                                             
44 Griffin, On Human Rights, 138. I should note that in Griffin’s case, this appeal to 
agreement is one strand of a more complex justificatory cable: Griffin also offers a 
sophisticated argument about the intelligibility of certain basic values.  
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invoking an assumed common consensus on moral value should also put pressure on the 
wisdom of such a justificatory strategy. 
 
                                                             
* For helpful comments I am grateful to Martin Ajei, Rowan Cruft, Katrin Flikschuh, 
Adrian Haddock, Eghosa Osaghae, Avia Pasternak, Kofi Quashigah, Andrew Sharp, Ajume 
Wingo, and audiences at the ALSP, the LSE, and the University of Ghana.  
 
